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YEAREND SALES OF LOSSES IN
REAL ESTATE PARTNERSHIPS
Donald J. Weidner*
I. INTRODUCTION
YEAREND OFFERINGS OF partnership interests have become quite
popular, particularly in the context of real estate partnerships struc-
tured to produce substantial tax losses in the initial years of operation.
Generally, a limited partnership is formed with a promoter as a general
partner and another promoter or a straw man as a limited partner,1 and
the partnership's transactions are structured to maximize and accelerate
deductions. Shortly before yearend, investors searching for tax shelter
are admitted as limited partners after having been offered the substan-
tial inducement of an allocation of tax losses as if they had been part-
ners for the entire year.
Neither the Code nor the Regulations specifically limits an incom-
ing partner to a pro-rata share of the partnership's tax losses based on
his period of ownership. Thus, unless a proration requirement can be
inferred, an individual may become a partner for 1 day and share in tax
losses for the entire year, a result that some commentators and practi-
tioners defend.2 This article will demonstrate that existing proration
requirements can be interpreted to deprive yearend admittees of retro-
active loss allocations, and will also suggest further arguments against
granting yearend admittees the tax benefits they seek.
HI. THE PRORATION REQUIREMENTS
Two existing proration rules can be interpreted to deny the year-
end admittee the opportunity to share in partnership deductions in-
curred before his admission to the partnership. The first is the rule
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University College of Law.
B.S. 1966, Fordham University; J.D. 1969, University of Texas.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor W. Jacobs of the
Florida State University College of Law and to John M. Foster, now a
third-year student at the University of South Carolina School of Law,
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1. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act requires one general and one limited
partner in a limited partnership from its inception. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSEIP
AcT§ 1.
2. See, e.g., Kanter, Real Estate Tax Shelters, 51 TAxEs 770, 779-800 (1973).
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that a partnership is deemed to be terminated for tax purposes if a 50-
percent or greater interest in partnership capital and profits is sold or
exchanged within a 12-month period. If the admission of new part-
ners brings the 50-percent rule into play, the partnership that incurred
the losses will be deemed terminated for tax purposes, and the late-
arriving investors will be deemed to be members of a new partnership
rather than the one that incurred the losses. The second proration rule
provides that partners who sell or exchange any part of their interests
must prorate items of partnership income or loss with their -transferees
on the basis of their periods and extent of ownership.4  This rule ap-
plies even if the initial partnership has not been terminated for tax pur-
poses. Because both rules relate directly to the taxable years of part-
nerships and partners, a brief introduction to the manipulation of tax-
able years is in order.
The relative taxable years of partnerships and their members have
long been manipulated to achieve tax advantages. The partnership is
a tax-reporting but not a tax-paying entity, and may have a different
taxable year than its partners. A partner must include in his individual
tax return his distributive share of partnership income, gain, loss, de-
duction or credit 5 for any partnership year ending with or within his
taxable year.6 Until the enactment of the 1954 Code, any 12-month
period could be selected as a partnership's taxable year. Income re-
ceived by a partnership might not be taxed for as many as 23 months
after receipt. A common tax postponement strategy was to adopt
a January 31st fiscal year for partnerships whose individual members
reported on a calendar year basis.' Under this arrangement, the part-
nership's income for the 11-month period of February 1st to December
31st would not be reported by the individual partners until the end of
the following December."
The 1954 Code created two simple rules to deal with the problem.
First, a partnership "may not change to, or adopt, a taxable year other
than that of all its principal partners unless it establishes, to the satisfac-
tion of the Secretary or his delegate, a business purpose therefor."9  A
3. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 708(b)(1)(B) [hereinafter references to
the Code will be by section number only].
4. §§ 706(c)(2)(A), (B).
5. § 702(a).
6. § 706(a).
7. Horn, Taxable Years of Partners and Partnerships, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED.
TAx. 297 (1967).
8. Taxpayers soon learned, however, that manipulating the taxable years of part-
ners and partnerships to postpone the reporting of income could result in unexpected
bunching of income on the death of a partner. See Jackson, et al., The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1954), for a discussion
of the controversy on this point prior to the enactment of the Code. The Code now
provides that the taxable year of a partnership will not close prematurely with respect
to a partner who dies. § 706(c)(2)(A)(ii).
9. § 706(b) (1). A newly formed partnership may adopt a calendar year without
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corresponding rule provides that a partner "may not change to a taxable
year other than that of a partnership in which he is a principal partner
unless he establishes, to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate,
a business purpose therefor."' Once a taxable year has been estab-
lished by a partnership, it continues until permission to change is ob-
tained or until some event gives the partnership the right to choose a
new taxable year.
Until just before the passage of the 1954 Code, partnerships were
electing new taxable years when they were dissolved under local
law. "Under the 1939 Code and the easy-going administrative pol-
icy of the Service as it related to partnerships, a sale of a partner-
ship interest was considered generally to effect a termination of the old
and the birth of a new partnership for Federal income tax purposes.""
In 1953, however, the Service ruled that a change in the membership
of a partnership resulting from the retirement, death, or addition of a
partner does not terminate the partnership for tax purposes. 2 There-
fore, partnership returns "should continue to be filed on the basis of
the annual accounting period previously established by the partner-
ship.' 3
A. The 50-Percent Termination Rule
The 1954 Code retained the philosophy of this ruling and elimi-
nated the opportunity for partners to terminate their partnership for
tax purposes by selling a partnership interest or admitting a new part-
ner. 4  The Code clearly distinguishes -termination for tax purposes
from dissolution under state law.15  It provides that a partnership shall
not be terminated for tax purposes unless no part of its business "con-
tinues to be carried on by any of its partners in a partnership," or unless
"within a 12-month period there is a sale or exchange of 50 percent
or more of the total interest in partnership capital and profits."'"
securing prior approval from the Commissioner if its principal partners are not all on
the same taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(b)(1)(ii) (1956).
10. § 706(b)(2). "Principal partner" is defined as "a partner having an interest
of 5 percent or more in partnership profits or capital." § 706(b)(3).
11. Horn, supra note 7, at 310.
12. Rev. Rul. 144, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 212-13. This ruling applies to limited as
well as general partnerships. Rev. Rul. 54-484, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 242.
13. Rev. Rul. 144, supra note 12, at 213.
14. § 706(c)(1):
Except in the case of a termination of a partnership and except as provided in
paragraph (2) of this subsection, the taxable year of a partnership shall not close as
a result of the death of a partner, the entry of a new partner, the liquidation of a
partner's interest in the partnership, or the sale or exchange of a partner's interest
in the partnership.
The exceptions in paragraph (2) are discussed infra. In general, they concern the clos-
ing of a partnership's taxable year with respect to a selling partner, but not termination
of the partnership itself, which is governed by § 708.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c)(1) (1956).16, 55 708(a), (b)(1).
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The basic purpose of the 50-percent rule was to prevent the ma-
nipulation of taxable years discussed above. Under the bill as reported
by both the House and the Senate, the partners could agree that the
partnership would not terminate-that is, its taxable year would not
close with respect to the remaining partners-upon the sale or ex-
change of a 50-percent or greater interest.1
7
This election was eliminated by the Conference Committee in
order to prevent the postponement of income that could result if
an interest in a fiscal year partnership were sold to an individual
on a different tax year. As the lesser of two evils, the partnership
year must close, with the resultant bunching of the remaining
partners' incomes, and the partnership must then adopt a new
taxable year consonant with the principal partner provisions of
Section 706(b). i s
Therefore, when the 50-percent rule applies, the partners cannot treat
the partnership as continuing for tax purposes.' The rule is broad
in scope; it covers all sales or exchanges within any period of 12 con-
secutive months, including those to other members of the partnership."
When a new partner purchases an existing partnership interest,
there is clearly a "sale or exchange" within the meaning of the 50-per-
cent rule. The critical question is whether the admission of an addi-
tional partner also constitutes a sale or exchange. The Regulations
provide that admission of a new partner is not a sale or exchange within
the meaning of the 50-percent rule2' unless property is contrib-
uted by one partner and the same or other property is distributed
to another partner within a short period,22 in which event the transaction
is treated as an exchange of property between the partners. 23  For ex-
ample, if D is admitted to ABC partnership upon making a $10,000
contribution to capital, and shortly thereafter A withdraws from the
partnership and receives a $10,000 distribution, the transaction will be
17. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1954); S. REp. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954).
18. Jackson, et al., supra note 8, at 1198.
19. The 50-percent rule has acquired new significance since the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, which restricts the availability of certain accelerated depreciation methods to
"first users." §§ 167(c)(2), (j)(2)(A)(ii). If a partnership is terminated for tax pur-
poses by operation of the 50-percent rule, it may no longer be entitled to use the method
of accelerated depreciation it was using before termination.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.708.1(b)(1)(ii) (1956).
21. Id.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(c)(3) (1956).
23. J. PENNELL & J. O'BYRNE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF PARTNERS AND PART-
NERSHIPS 128-29 (1970):
[There is a note of warning by reference to Treasury Regulation 1.731-1(c)(3)
that a contribution by a new partner and a related distribution to an old partner
may not disguise what is in reality a purchase. . . . Presumably, then, the con-
tribution and distribution in rapid succession also may be treated as a "step transac-
tion" resulting in the same consequences-including termination-as would a sale of
an interest. ...
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recognized as a sale by A of his partnership interest to D.24
An actual distribution should not be needed to trigger this turn-
around distribution exception. Crane v. Commissioner2 established
that relief from liabilities, including nonrecourse liabilities, is treated
as a distribution of cash, at least when the liability is included in the
taxpayer's depreciable basis.2 6  The Code now specifically pro-
vides that any decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities
"shall be considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the
partnership." 7  As a corollary, any increase in his share in partnership
liabilities "shall be considered as a contribution of money by such part-
ner to the partnership."2
Under these rules, a new partner makes a constructive contribu-
tion of cash to the extent he is allocated a share of existing partner-
ship liabilities and the existing partners receive a corresponding con-
structive distribution of cash.29 In a limited partnership, new limited
partners are automatically allocated a share in the nonrecourse ° liabil-
ities of the partnership "in the same proportion as they share the prof-
its."3 1  As a result, when a new limited partner is admitted to a part-
nership which has nonrecourse liabilities, he makes a constructive
contribution and the old partners receive a constructive distribution of
cash. In other words, a constructive turnabout distribution takes place.
Arguably, this constructive turnabout distribution is sufficient to make
the admission of a new partner an "exchange" within the meaning of
the 50-percent rule.
At first glance, this argument may seem forced, but it is neither
farfetched nor extreme when compared to other consequences of shifts
in proportionate shares of nonrecourse liabilities. For example, the
constructive distribution that takes place when a partner is relieved of
a share in partnership liabilities is a taxable event. If a limited partner
24. But see Kaster, Real Estate Limited Partnerships Special Tax Allocations,
N.Y.U. 31sT INST. ON FED. TAX. 1799, 1814 (1973):
rIlt is possible that without regard to elapsed time, payment of newly contributed
funds to a partner, other than in his capacity as a partner, might not constitute a
"distribution," for example, use of the contributed funds to make payments to a
partner's contracting company under an existing agreement to construct an improve-
ment for the partnership.
25. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. A new partner's basis in his partnership interest is the amount of money plus
the adjusted basis of any property he contributes to the partnership. § 722.
27. § 752(b).
28. § 752(a).
29. See Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 4, at 11.
30. In the case of a limited partnership, the partnership liability must be nonre-
course to enable the limited partners to share in it for basis purposes. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-1(e) (1956). Of course it is critical to share in partnership liabilities for basis
purposes because a partner may not deduct his share of partnership losses below his basis
in his partnership interest.. § 704(d).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
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simply withdraws from the partnership, he is treated as having received
a distribution of cash to the extent that he is relieved of nonrecourse
liabilities.32  So, too, original partners must pay capital gains tax on the
constructive distribution that results from the admission of new part-
ners, to the extent that the distribution exceeds their bases in their part-
nership interests. 3 In short, because a new limited partner is auto-
matically allocated a share of the partnership's nonrecourse liabilities,
the original partners are deemed to receive a distribution of cash for
basis purposes. They should also be deemed to receive a distribution
within the meaning of the Regulations dealing with the 50-percent rule,
since these Regulations treat the admission of a new partner as an ex-
change of an existing interest when a turnabout distribution is present.
Assuming that the 50-percent rule applies, the question is whether
a 50-percent interest in both capital and profits has been shifted. The
sale of a 40-percent interest in capital and a 60-percent interest in prof-
its, for example, will not bring the rule into play. 4 The problem is
that clear definitions of "capital" and "profits" do not exist, although
these are key concepts in partnership taxation.15  The Regulations re-
flect a fairly simple model which includes only two basic allocations:
one defining the partners' shares in operating income or loss (profits);
and one defining the partners' shares in the underlying partnership as-
sets (capital). Because real estate partnerships frequently use more
elaborate allocation systems, determining whether a 50-percent interest
in profits and capital has been shifted may be difficult.
Real estate partnerships typically use three basic allocations: net
cash flow;36 proceeds of refinancing or sale; and taxable income or loss.
Net cash flow will be greater than taxable income whenever the de-
preciation deduction exceeds debt amortization.3 7  Many partnerships
strive for positive cash flow coupled with tax losses that can be allocated
32. Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974 INT. Rnv. BULL. No. 4, at 11.
33. § 731.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii) (1956).
35. "[A]s a practical matter, it is frequently difficult to accurately characterize the
interest received by the syndicator as either an interest in profits or an interest in capi-
tal .... ." Ben-Horin, Real Estate Syndications, Limited Partnerships, U. So. CAL. 1972
TAX INST. 71,85. See also Aronsohn, Admission of a New Partner for Cash, Property
or Services, 23 TAx LAw. 325, 331-32 (1970).
36. Basically, net cash flow is cash-in minus cash-out. For example, in the case
of an apartment or office building, net cash flow is total rent receipts less expenses for
maintenance, real estate taxes, and debt service.
37. Because depreciation is a deduction for a non-cash expenditure and debt
amortization is cash expenditure for which there is no deduction, a partnership's taxable
income is its net cash flow less depreciation plus debt amortization. Therefore, in any
year in which a partnership's depreciation deduction is greater than its expenditure for
debt amortization, its taxable income will be less than its net cash flow. If the depreci-
ation deduction is greater than the sum of net cash flow and debt amortization, the
partnership will have tax losses at the same time it has a positive cash flow.
[Vol. 1974
YEAREND SALES OF LOSSES
to the partners and used to shelter income from other sources. Separ-
ate allocations of net cash flow and taxable income or loss are used
to allocate tax benefits and cash benefits to different partners. For
example, a promoter-partner who desires a substantial share of net cash
flow may be quite willing to pass most or all of the tax losses to his
investor-partners. Similarly, a separate allocation of the proceeds of
refinancing or sale can be used to give promoter-partners a greater
share in cash benefits than they get of tax losses. 8
Which of the three allocations just mentioned is the allocation
of "profits" referred to in the basis and termination rules? At first
glance, the answer seems to be the partnership's allocation of net cash
flow. But the Regulations define the partners' ratio for sharing "the
general profits or losses of the partnership" as the ratio for sharing "the
taxable income or loss of the partnership as described in section 702
(a)(9)." 9  If the Regulations are correct in indicating that "profits"
is primarily a tax concept, not a cash concept, the partnership's alloca-
tion of taxable income or loss is the allocation of profits. The 50-
percent termination rule would therefore apply if the newly admitted
partners are allocated more than 50 percent of the partnership's taxable
income or loss, even if they are allocated less than 50 percent of the
net cash flow.
The Regulations may be misleading, however, because they were
not drafted with separate allocations of net cash flow and taxable in-
come in mind. "Profits" may be primarily a cash concept, not a tax
concept. If so, net cash flow would initially appear to be the best
measure of profits. In some partnerships, however, the financing ar-
rangements are such that most of the cash generated by the business
is used to retire debt service. Consequently, the allocation of net cash
flow has little or no significance to any of the partners. Instead, the
important cash interest takes the form of equity buildup, which is al-
located by the partners' ratio for sharing the proceeds of refinancing or
sale.40
Determining whether a 50-percent interest in capital has been
transferred is generally easier than determining whether an interest in
profits has been shifted. In most cases, an interest in capital is gen-
erally understood to be an interest in partnership assets. Thus, an in-
terest in capital has been found to have been transferred when the cap-
ital account of one partner was debited in favor of the capital account of
38. See the discussion of three-way allocation systems infra at text accompanying
notes 120-23.
39. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(1), (2) (1956).
40. In any event, consistency should be required of the partners. If they claim
more than a 50-percent interest in profits in order to increase their bases in their part-
nership interests, they should be held to have received the same interest in profits for
the purposes of the termination rules.
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another partner,41  and when a partner received the right to
share in partnership assets on dissolution. 2  It will usually be
clear whether the limited partners have received a 50-percent interest
in partnership assets on liquidation. Complications can arise, however,
if the ratio for sharing the proceeds of refinancing differs from the ratio
for sharing the proceeds of sale, or if the allocation ratio shifts after
a certain amount of profit is distributed.
Real estate partnerships can generally avoid the 50-percent rule
by passing the newly admitted partners less than a 50-percent share
in the proceeds of refinancing and sale.43 In at least some cases, how-
ever, the rule will effectively prevent promoters from completely
changing the composition of the partnership while avoiding termina-
tion. The change should not be considered immune from the rule
simply because it is accomplished by the admission of new partners
rather than the sale of existing interests.
B. The Liquidation-of-Interest Provisions
If a partner sells or liquidates his entire interest in the partnership,
the partnership's taxable year is closed with respect to him.44 Termi-
nation has two basic consequences. First, the partner must include in his
gross income his distributive share of partnership income, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit for that portion of the partnership's taxable year
that ends with the disposition of his entire interest. To avoid an in-
terim closing of the partnership's books, his distributive share of those
items may be estimated "by taking his pro rata part of the amount of
such items he would have included in his taxable income had he re-
mained a partner until the end of the partnership taxable year."'" Pro-
ration may be based on the portion of the taxable year that has expired
or on any other reasonable measure.
The second consequence is that the transferee must include in his
income all items of partnership income for the remainder of the part-
nership taxable year.
41. Harry W. Lehman, 19 T.C. 659 (1953), accord, Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)
(1956); Pennell, Tax Considerations in Organizing a Partnership, U. So. CAL. 1973 TAx
INST. 333, 353.
42. Leonard A. Farris, 22 T.C. 104, 111-13 (1954).
43. See also Kaster, supra note 24, at 1814:
Even if admission of a new partner causes a termination, it is possible that part
of the expenses incurred by the terminated partnership may be claimed by the new
investor. The possible accomplishment of this is in the nature of the resurrection
of a deduction rather than a retroactive allocation. The theory is that the investor
has acquired a portion of a capitalized expense not entirely deducted by the termi-
nated tartnership as of the date of its termination. If the acauisition theory is
valid, it would support deduction only of the unamortized portion of capitalized
items such as financing fees.
44. § 706(c)(2)(A)(i). The taxable year does not close with respect to the re-
maining partners unless § 708 applies.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c)(2)(ii) (1956).
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Any partner who is the transferee of such partner's interest shall
include in his taxable income, as his distributive share of items
described in section 702(a) with respect to the acquired interest,
the pro rata part (determined by the method used by the trans-
feror partner) of the amount of such items he would have in-
cluded had he been a partner from the beginning of the taxable
year of the partnership.4"
In short, when a partner sells his entire interest in the partnership, he
cannot shift to the buyer his share of partnership losses for the portion
of the partnership year he was a partner. He must report those losses
himself; the buyer must report the partnership income and loss attribut-
able to the remainder of the partnership year.
Although the mechanism is not the same, proration is also re-
quired when a partner sells less than his entire interest in the partner-
ship. The Code provides that the taxable year of the partnership shall
not close
. . .with respect to a partner who sells or exchanges less than his
entire interest in the partnership or with respect to a partner
whose interest is reduced, but such partner's distributive share
of items described in section 702(a) shall be determined by tak-
ing into account his varying interests in the partnership during
the taxable year.47
The legislative history of this provision contains repeated statements
that proration is required when a partner's interest is "reduced."4
The basic question, therefore, is whether the admission of addi-
tional partners reduces the interest of the original partners within the
meaning of this provision. The proper answer appears to be that the
proration requirement does apply to the admission of a new partner.49
Partial sale of an existing partnership interest is so similar to the admis-
sion of a new partner that a partial sale can almost always be structured
in the form of an admission of a new partner.50 Consider the follow-
ing:
Example 1. General partner A, through a straw man, owns nine
limited partnership interests in a partnership of which he is a
general partner. Under the partnership agreement, limited part-
ners are allocated 90 percent of all the economic and tax conse-
quences of the partnership. At year end, eight of the nine limited
partnership interests are sold to investors.
Example 2. General partner A establishes a limited partner-
46. Id.
47. § 706(c) (2) (B). The Regulations contain only one short paragraph concern-
ing the disposition by a partner of less than his interest in the partnership. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.706-1(c)(4) (1956).
48. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954).
49. J. PENNELL & J. O'BYRNE, supra note 23, at 129.
50. 2 S. SuRREY, et al., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 127 (1973).
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ship with a straw man as the sole limited partner. Under the part-
nership agreement, the limited partners as a class are allocated
90 percent of all the economic and tax consequences of the partner-
ship. At yearend, eight more limited partners are admitted.
Proration would clearly be required in example 1, since an existing
partnership interest has been sold. The question is whether the pro-
ration requirement can be avoided by casting the transaction in the
form of example 2. Even if a sale of an existing partnership interest
is hard to find in example 2, the unavoidable conclusion is that the
general partner's interest has been reduced within the meaning of the
statute. In both examples the general partner has parted with 80-per-
cent of all the economic and tax consequences of the partnership.
C. Arguments Against Proration
In part because the admission of new partners so clearly consti-
tutes a reduction in interest within the meaning of the Code, the advo-
cates of retroactive allocation have not based their arguments on the
history, structure, or interpretation of the provisions just discussed.
Generally, their argument has been that the proration requirements
are overriden by other provisions. Override is generally discussed in
the context of the disposition-of-interest provisions and not in connec-
tion with the 50-percent rule, which is largely ignored, for two reasons.
The first is that the constructive distribution analysis suggested above
has received little attention in the literature." The second is the com-
mon assumption that the first year of partnership existence is a grace
period during which membership may be enlarged without causing ter-
mination under the 50-percent rule. 52
1. Section 761(c)
The primary argument made by opponents of mandatory proration
is that retroactive allocation of losses to late-admitted partners is specif-
ically authorized by section 76 1(c):
For purposes of this subchapter, a partnership agreement includes
any modifications of the partnership agreement made prior to, or
at, the time prescribed by law for the filing of the partnership
return for the taxable year (not including extensions) which are
agreed to by all the partners, or which are adopted in such other
manner as may be provided by the partnership agreement.
In short, retroactive loss allocations to new partners are said to be au-
51. But see Parker & Lee, Constructive Cash Distributions in a Partnership: How
and When They Occur, 41 J. TAXATION 88 (1974), in which the authors conclude that
the constructive cash distributions on the admission of new partners were not intended
to result in termination.
52. See P. RoMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 2.025, at 2-15 n.25 (1973).
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thorized by the rule that modifications of partnership agreements re-
late back to the beginning of the taxable year."
Smith v. Commissioner" is one of the cases cited as authority for
this proposition. In 1954 two brothers, Morris and Hyman Smith,
entered into an oral partnership agreement to engage in the manu-
facture and sale of electrical equipment. They agreed to contribute
one-half of the capital each and to share profits and losses equally. In
early 1957 they had a falling-out, and began a series of negotiations
that concluded in an agreement that Hyman would buy out Morris'
interest. According to the Tax Court, the basic issue was how the par-
ties had agreed to allocate the taxable income for the partnership's final
year. Hyman argued that the original agreement to report equal shares
remained unchanged. Morris, however, asserted that the original
agreement had been orally amended to provide that Hyman would be
allocated all the partnership's profits for the final year. The Tax Court
agreed with Morris."
The court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's finding that Hyman
had agreed to render the entire net income of the partnership for that
year taxable to him. The court said that this agreement related back
to the beginning of the partnership's taxable year by virtue of section
761(c),56 rejecting Hyman's argument that Morris "could not avoid
his tax by a retroactive sale of his partnership interest. '5 7 The court
also rejected Hyman's argument that the retroactive allocation should
be disregarded because it was made for the principal purpose of avoid-
ance or evasion of tax.58 The court found no evidence that Morris had
such a purpose when the modification was made. According to the
Tax Court, Hyman's "real motive was to become the sole owner of the
company's net profit for the period."'59
For our purposes, Smith is fairly inconclusive. Although Smith
did hold that a retroactive amendment could alter tax liability, it in-
volved two individuals who had been partners for several years, rather
than a yearend admittee. Therefore, there was no question of allocat-
ing losses incurred before the taxpayer's admission. Furthermore, be-
cause the parties bargained over actual economic profits and losses, not
53. Smith v. Commissioner, 21 CCH TAX Cr. REP. No. 294, at 1563, 1567 (1962),
a~f'd, 331 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1964).
54. Id.
55. Hyman's promise to report any partnership income had not been stated in the
written buy-out agreement because Hyman and his attorney, who had denied Morris ac-
cess to the partnership books and records, had persuaded Morris that there would be
no profits in order to induce Morris to sell his interest to Hyman at a lower price. Id.
at 1568.
56. 331 F.2d at 301.
57. Id. at 300.
58. § 704(b)(2). See text accompanying notes 124-45 infra.
59. 21 CCH TAx Cr. REP. No. 294, at 1568 (1962).
No. 4]
LAW FORUM
merely over tax consequences, the conclusion that the arrangement had
substantial economic effect seems inescapable.
Town and Country Plymouth, Inc. v. United States,60 another
widely cited case, provides even less authority for retroactive loss allo-
cations to late-admitted partners. Town and Country involved a lim-
ited partnership formed in 1960 to develop and manufacture an auto-
matic pinspotting machine for bowling alleys. The partnership agree-
ment was executed by six general partners, who contributed services
and know-how, and numerous limited partners who contributed all the
capital of the partnership. The general partners had no obligation to
contribute toward losses as long as the partnership assets were suf-
ficient to pay them. The agreement further provided that profits
would be divided between the general and the limited partners in a
ratio of 51 to 49, but did not mention a division of losses. A loss
was incurred during 1960. Because the agreement did not specify that
this loss was to be charged to the limited partners, the partnership
agreement was amended to that effect.
During the summer of 1961, the plaintiff purchased the interest
of one of the limited partners for $2,500, and shortly thereafter made
a $72,000 cash contribution to the capital of the partnership.
Throughout 1961, the partnership continued to incur losses resulting
from cash expenditures made entirely out of the capital contributions
of the limited partners. No demand was ever made that the general
partners contribute toward the rapidly mounting losses, and no such
contribution was ever made by a general partner. Cash expenditures
made by the general partners were treated as loans to the partnership
that were repaid by the issuance of stock after incorporation.
In early 1962, prior to the time for filing the partnership's 19--1
return, a retroactive amendment to the partnership agreement was
adopted "for the purpose of recording the parties' understanding that
losses for the previous year were to be charged solely to the capital
accounts of the limited partners." '  Plaintiff was allocated 49 percent
of the loss, because its capital contribution was 49 percent of the total
capital contribution of the limited partners. In a brief and unreasoned
opinion, the district court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to
deduct the loss allocated to it by the partnership agreement.
Town and Country is weak authority for retroactive allocations of
losses to late-admitted partners for several reasons. The court's opin-
ion fails to mention the fact that the plaintiff and its transferor had pro-
rated the losses between themselves. 2 The Service complained that
60. 2 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (67-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) 9680, at 85,274
(C.D. Cal. 1961).
61. Id. at 85,276.
62. McGuire, Retroactive Allocations Among Partners: The Rodman Decision,
52 TAxEs 325, 330 (1974).
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the limited partners as a class had been retroactively allocated a greater
share of losses than profits, and disallowed plaintiffs deduction to the
extent it was based on an allocation of more than 49 percent of total
loss to the limited partners. The court apparently found that the al-
leged retroactive amendment was retroactive only insofar as it reduced
to writing the agreement the parties had had all along. Nor does re-
troactivity appear to be an issue with respect to the plaintiff, since all
the losses allocated to the plaintiff were apparently incurred after its
admission to the partnership. The opinion suggests that the tax losses
allocated plaintiff were those it bore economically. Therefore, the de-
cision is simply an affirmation of the rule that deductions for cash ex-
penditures can be allocated to the partners shouldering them economi-
cally, when the principal purpose is not tax avoidance6 3
The latest decision in the area and the one most clearly in point
is Norman Rodman,14 in which the Tax Court held that a late-admitted
partner had to report his share of partnership gain on the basis of
the full taxable year. The joint venture in Rodman was formed in
1955 with four equal participants. On November 2, 1956, one of the
participants withdrew by selling his entire interest to the remaining par-
ticipants. Three days later, the son of one of the remaining partici-
pants was admitted as a 22-percent participant. A deficiency was as-
sessed at the venture level for 1956, and the question was whether the
Service could hold the son liable for the deficiency as if he had partici-
pated for the entire year.
The son argued that his share of profits and losses was intended
to begin with his admission to the venture. The Service alleged and
proved that the intent had been to retroactively amend the joint venture
agreement to allow him to share in the entire year's profits and losses.
In the venture's partnership return for 1956, he had been allocated 22
percent of the venture's losses for the entire year, and he had filed his
individual return on the same basis. The Service merely wanted to
tax him for the same share of what it determined to be a gain rather
than a loss for the entire year. The court held that the Service could
hold the son responsible for a share in partnership gain for the entire
year, in accordance with the amended agreement of the parties.
Although some defenders of retroactive loss allocation rely on
Rodman, it is weak precedent for a variety of reasons. First, the court
clearly stated that proration was required with respect to the partner
who withdrew.65 Second, although the interests of the three remain-
63. For example, a partner who undertakes to pay all research and experimental
expenditures may be allocated the deductions for the full amount of those expenditures,
provided the allocation is not made for the principal purpose of the avoidance or evasion
of tax. Treas. Reg. § 1-704-1(b)(2), Example (5) (1964).
64. 32 CCH TAx Cr. MEM. No. 277, at 1307 (1973).
65. Id. at 1320.
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ing partners were reduced, the court did not discuss the applicability
of section 706(c)(2)(b), which would appear to require proration.
The court's precise reasoning is unclear. Numerous other issues were
involved, and both the court66 and subsequent commentators6 7 have
noted that the case was poorly litigated. In short, the court did not
deal satisfactorily with the issue of retroactivity. Third, the extent to
which retroactivity was actually involved is unclear, for the government
concluded that Rodman "was active in the joint venture prior to the
date when he was allegedly brought into the venture."66  Fourth, the
government, not the taxpayer, attempted to establish retroactivity-and
of taxable income, not tax losses. Perhaps the court felt that since the
son had claimed losses for the entire year, holding him responsible for
the entire year was not unfair when the losses were redetermined to
be gains. Finally, the Rodman holding is questionable insofar as the
son wound up with a share of the tax burden greater than his share
of the economic benefits. Nevertheless, Rodman remains at least
some authority for the proposition that the requirement to prorate upon
the reduction of a partnership interest can be superceded by 761(c).69
2. Section 704(b)(2)
A related argument against mandatory proration is that retroactive
loss allocations are a legitimate exercise of the flexibility allowed by
section 704(a), which generally provides that allocations of items
of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit are to be determined by the
partnership agreement. Stated differently, -the argument is that retro-
active allocations of losses, if they are subject to scrutiny at all, are spe-
cial allocations that will be disregarded only if their principal purpose
is tax avoidance or evasion.7 0
At first glance, conceding that a practice is subject to a limitation,
especially such a broad limitation, might seem a peculiar way to defend
66. For example, the court stated: "Neither party has raised section 704(e) de-
spite its apparent applicability." Id. at 1319.
67. One of the more astute commentators on real estate partnerships has examined
the arguments in Rodman and concluded that the Service's position was poorly and in-
correctly argued. McGuire, supra note 62, at 326-28.
68. Id. at 325 n.3.
69. The Committee on Partnerships of the American Bar Association's Section on
Taxation has recently recommended that the Code be amended to provide
. . . that in the case of the disposition of less than the entire interest of a partner
in a partnership and in the case of the reduction of the interest of a partner, the
partner's varying interests in the partnership during the taxable year shall be com-
puted as if the partnership taxable year had closed as to such partner on the date
of the sale, exchange or reduction and without regard to any provision of the part-
nership agreement which seeks to vary this result in all cases where the principal
purpose of the provision is tax avoidance or evasion.
ABA Comm. on Partnerships, Tax Section Recommendation, No. 1974-6, Report of the
Committee on Partnerships, 27 TAx. LAW. 839, 851-52 (1974).
70. § 704(b)(2).
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the practice. Nevertheless, this is a sensible position for the advocates
of retroactive allocations. It really concedes nothing, because no one
has ever suggested that retroactive allocations are exempt from the lim-
itations of 704(b)(2). More importantly, uncertainties about the
application of the principal purpose limitation have prevented it from
becoming an effective weapon against tax avoidance schemes. In
short, the section 704 argument is an attempt to create a safe harbor
within the virtually nonexistent limitations of 704(b)(2).
One uncertainty about the principal purpose limitation is whether
it applies only to allocations of specific items of partnership income or
loss, or whether it also applies to allocations of total partnership income
or loss. In Jean V. Kresser,71 the Tax Court raised but did not reach
the question, which it said was a difficult one. The court did, however,
express sympathy for the position that allocations of total partnership
income or loss, as opposed to allocations of specific items, are not sub-
ject to the principal purpose limitation of 704(b)(2). 71 If allocations
of total income or loss are exempt from the limitation, late-admitted
partners could be brought within the exemption by retroactively allocat-
ing total partnership income or loss for the entire year. In the great
majority of real estate partnerships, such an allocation costs nothing be-
cause no taxable income is generated during the initial years. 73
Finally, even when a particular allocation is subject to the princi-
pal purpose limitation, the scope of this limitation is unclear.74  The
only decision to disregard an allocation on the basis of 704(b) is
71. 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
72. Id. at 1631 n.5.
73. Nor is it clear whether allocations of taxable income or loss are subject to the
principal purpose limitation, even if they control the allocation of all of the tax benefits
and none of the economic benefits. See text accompanying notes 121-22 infra.
74. The Regulations state the following are among the relevant circumstances in
determining whether the principal purpose of an allocation in a partnership agreement
is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax:
Whether the partnership or a partner individually has a business purpose for the
allocation; whether the allocation has "substantial economic effect", that is, whether
the allocation may actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the
total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences; whether related
items of income, gain loss, deduction, or credit from the same source are subject to
the same allocation; whether the allocation was made without recognition of normal
business factors and only after the amount of the specially allocated item could rea-
sonably be estimated; the duration of the allocation; and the overall tax conse-
quences of the allocation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956). The examples included in the Regulations to il-
lustrate the application of these six tests indicate that the presence or absence of any
one factor will not necessitate the recognition or disregard of an allocation. All the
surrounding facts must be considered, and that an allocation results in a tax saving to
all partners involved does not necessarily mean it will be disregarded. Similarly, just
because the parties would not have entered a transaction without a particular allocation
does not mean it will be found to have substantial economic effect apart from tax conse-
quences. The six tests are best viewed as interrelated avenues of inquiry to help deter-
mine all the economic consequences of a particular allocation,
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Stanley C. Orrisch,7 5 which involved such a clearcut violation of 704(b)
that it offers little insight into the scope of the principal purpose limita-
tion. Orrisch involved two husband-and-wife couples, the Orrisches
and the Crisafis, who were equal partners. One year, when the Crisa-
fis had substantial tax losses from other sources, the agreement was
changed to allocate to the Orrisches all the depreciation deductions
of the partnership. The court found that this shift in the allocation
of depreciation deductions, although reflected by a charge against the
Orrisches' capital account, would have no effect on any of the nontax
arrangements of the parties, not even on the division of the proceeds
of sale of partnership property. The basic test for determining
whether the principal purpose of an allocation is tax avoidance is
whether it has "a substantial economic effect, and is not merely a de-
vice for reducing -the taxes of certain partners, without actually affect-
ing -their shares of partnership income."76  The court said that the al-
location of all the depreciation deductions to the Orrisches would be
disregarded because it did not "actually affect the dollar amount of the
partners' share of the total partnership income and loss independently
of tax consequences. ' 77
A yearend admittee might argue that the retroactivity of a loss al-
location has a substantial economic effect if it is used for more than
determining tax losses. In response to the objection that a real estate
partnership in -the construction phase has nothing to distribute but
losses, two further arguments might be made. First, since liabilities
are not always known with certainty, newly admitted partners are put-
ting their capital at risk for liabilities from 'the entire year's operations.
In a sense, there is retroactivity of risk. Second, the allocation ratio
has substantial economic effect because it affects 'the allocation of any
future profits. The upshot is that the principal purpose limitation
seemingly offers no real test of the validity of retroactive loss alloca-
tions, for it is at best a vague check on -the partners' power to determine
allocations by agreement.
In summary, commentators have expressed a wide range of opin-
ion concerning the applicability of the proration requirements.7 8  Some
75. 55 T.C. 395 (1970), aff'd, 73-556, 31 P-H AM. FED. TAX REP. 1069 (9th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
76. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
77. 55 T.C. at 404.
78. To require proration in the case of the partner admitted at yearend would es-
tablish the same kind of requirement of proration of losses that exists in the case of
the subchapter S corporation. The shareholder of a subchapter S corporation is en-
titled to deduct his prorata share of the corporation's net operating loss for his taxable
year in which or with which the taxable year of the corporation ends. § 1374(c):
[A] shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's net operating loss is the
sum of the portions of the corporation's daily net operating loss attributable on a
pro rata basis to the shares held by him on each day of the taxable year. For pur-
poses of the preceding sentence, the corporation's daily net operating loss is the cor-
poration's net operating loss divided by the number of days in the taxable year,
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have asserted that retroactive allocations of losses are permitted
whether the late admittee is admitted as an additional partner or as
the transferee of an existing partnership interest. 79  Others have as,
serted that proration is not required in the case of the admission of
a new partner, even if it is -required in the case of a transferee. 0  Still
others have taken the position expressed in this article that the rules
requiring proration when a partnership interest is reduced apply
whether the reduction is effected by a direct sale or by admission of
a new partner, and -that these proration rules are not overridden by -the
more general provisions of 76 1(c) and 704(a).1'
III. THE PRIMACY OF LOSSES
It is common knowledge among lawyers and accountants that
yearend admittees to real estate partnerships are interested primarily,
if not exclusively, in acquiring tax losses -that can be used to offset their
income from other sources. Indeed, the principal selling document is
often a computer print-out that indicates the amount of the retroactive
loss allocation and projects a schedule of future losses and how long
it will -take investors in different brackets -to recoup their investments
through loss allocations.
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, it will examine the
principal techniques used by promoters to generate and accelerate
losses for investors seeking tax shelter. Second, it will consider
whether the peculiarly loss-oriented nature of the real estate partner-
ship suggests additional arguments that could be used to challenge
some or all of the tax benefits sought by yearend admittees.
A. The Generation of Losses
1. Limitations on Prepaid Interest
The relatively recent crackdown on the deductibility of prepaid
interest has resulted in more aggressive use of other techniques to
generate and accelerate deductions. Section 163(a) of the Code pro-
vides a deduction for "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable
year on indebtedness," and prepayment of interest has 'long been used
to accelerate deductions into the early years of an investment. Prior
79. Kanter, Real Estate Tax Shelters, 51 TAXES 770, 799-800 (1973).
80. Halperin & Tucker, Tax Consequences of Operating Low Income Housing
(FHA 236) Programs, 36 J. TAXATION 80, 82 (1972):
To overcome this [the application of the proration requirements of § 706] and
permit a partner coming in late in the year to be entitled to tax losses from an ear-
lier period, it would appear that the partner should be admitted as a new partner as
opposed to his purchasing a partnership interest from one of the other partners.
81. J. PENNELL & J. O'BYRNE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXAT ION OF PARTNERS AND PART-
NERSHIPS 129 (1970); McGuire, Retroactive Allocations Among Partner&: The Rodman
Decision, 52 TAXES 325-30 (1974).
No. 4] 549
LAW FORUM [Vol. 1974
to 1968, cash basis taxpayers commonly took advantage of this pro-
vision by prepaying and immediately deducting up to 5 years of inter-
est."2 In 1968, however, the Service issued a Revenue Ruling sharply
limiting deductions of prepaid interest. s3
The Ruling is based on the authority of the Service to require a
taxpayer to adopt an accounting method that clearly reflects income. 4
It states that prepayment of interest for a period extending more than
12 months beyond the end of the current taxable year will automatic-
ally be regarded as a "material distortion of income." 5  It further pro-
vides that prepayments for periods of 12 months or less will be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a material dis-
tortion of income has resulted." If a material distortion has resulted,
the taxpayer will be required to deduct the prepaid interest in the years
in which it would have become due, rather than the year in which it
was paid. In short, the Ruling places a cash basis taxpayer on the
accrual basis with respect to the prepaid interest.8 7
82. After decisions in the Tax Court unfavorable to the Service on the issue of the
deductibility of prepaid interest, the Commissioner issued I.T. 3740, 1945 CuM. BULL.
109, in which he ruled that a cash basis taxpayer could properly deduct a 5-year interest
payment in the year of disbursement.
83. Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 76.
84. The source of the authority to reallocate the deduction for prepaid interest is
§ 446(b), which permits the Service to order a recomputation of taxable income if the
method of accounting used by the taxpayer "does not clearly reflect income." There-
fore, the Ruling limiting the deductibility of prepaid interest states that "[w]here a mate-
rial distortion of income has been found to result from the deduction of prepaid interest,
the Service will require the taxpayer to change his method of accounting with respect
to such prepaid interest in order to allocate it over the taxable years involved." Rev.
Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 76, 77.
85. The conclusive nature of the presumption in the case of prepayments for pe-
riods greater than 12 months has been criticized as exceeding the authority of the Com-
missioner insofar as it deprives the taxpayer of the opportunity to rebut the assertion
of material distortion. Gabinet, The Interest Deduction. Several New Installments in
a Continuing Saga, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 466, 474-75 (1970).
86. There is presently some question whether and to what extent the Service has
retreated from the conclusive presumption of material distortion in the case of prepay-
ments covering a period greater than 12 months. Rev. Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 Cum. BULL.
29, which was reported as a modification of Rev. Rul. 69-643, concerned a "loan process-
ing fee" of $1,200 paid and deducted by a cash-basis borrower in connection with a loan
for the purchase of a personal residence. Without referring to the presumption in cases
of prepayments covering more than 12 months, which was obviously involved, the Ruling
concluded that the prepayment did not constitute a material distortion of income. It
is not clear whether the Ruling simply provides an exception in the case of a purchase
of a personal residence, whether it is an indication that the presumption will not be ap-
plied in cases of de minimus point payments, or whether it modified Rev. Rul. 68-643
to permit the deduction of points generally. Gabinet, supra note 85, at 476. Cf. Rev.
Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 54, 55 (points can be deducted if given for use of
money; if payment for lender's services, must be capitalized).
87. Two additional arguments have been made in support of the ruling. The first
is that the prepayment of interest should be treated as a nondeductible capital expendi-
ture because it results in the acquisition by the borrower of an intangible asset, a right
to use money that extends beyond the year in which the prepayment is made. The sec-
ond is that prepayment, where refundable, is really only a deposit that is not deductible
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The Ruling states -that the factors to be considered in determining
whether income has -been materially distorted include the amount of
income in ,the taxable year of payment, the income of previous taxable
years, the amount of prepaid interest, the time of payment, the reason
for prepayment, and the existence of a varying rate of interest over
the term of the loan. These factors have been criticized as being
overly general and providing little concrete guidance." Furthermore,
some question exists whether the material distortion of income test will
be applied at the partnership level or on a partner-by-partner basis. To
the dismay of partnership syndicators, the Service has indicated it will
apply the distortion test at the partnership level.8 9  Consequently, the
amount of the individual partner's outside income presumably will not
be taken into account.
The test will be difficult to apply to real estate partnerships in
their initial year of operation. Not only will determining the extent
of distortion be difficult without previous years to provide a basis for
comparison, but in all likelihood no taxable income will be earned ei-
ther in the initial year or for the first few years thereafter. The rate
at which the partners recover their capital investment through tax losses
may be an important consideration. Whether prepayment is structured
for the benefit of the lender or the tax advantage of the partners may
also be important. If, for example, a lender requires payment of points
in order to increase its rate of return while staying within the usury
laws, this requirement could cut against a finding of material distortion
of income accounting methods. Even if the Service applies the distor-
tion test very tolerantly within the 12-month period, the presumption
of distortion raised by prepayment for a greater period assures con-
tinued aggressive exploration of other techniques to increase and ac-
celerate deductions.
2. Guaranteed Payments
A major reaction to the restrictions on the deductibility of prepaid
interest has taken place in the area of compensation of promoter-part-
until consumed. For an analysis of these two supporting rationalizations see Gabinet,
supra note 85, at 472-86.
88. Kanter, supra note 79, at 791-92, adds that:
Further confusion has been added by recent technical advice issued by the IRS
to the District Director in Los Angeles dealing specifically with prepaid interest in
a real estate tax shelter investment. In that instance, not only was it concluded that
a prepayment of interest for a period of less than 12 months after the end of the
taxable year of prepayment would be considered a material distortion of income, but
it was further concluded that the determination of the material distortion would be
made at the partnership rather than the individual level. This does not necessarily
preclude also determining that there is a material distortion of income at the indi-
vidual partner level. (Emphasis in original.)
89. For an examination of the controversy and the conclusion that the distortion
test should be applied at the partnership level in all cases see Comment, The Material
Distortion of Income Test as Applied to Prepaid Interest and Points Paid by Partner-
ships, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1318 (1973).
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ners. The Code provides that payments to a partner for services or
for the use of his capital constitute "guaranteed payments," which are
deductible by the partnership as if they were made to a nonpartner,
provided they are determined without regard to the income of the part-
nership.90 In an attempt to maximize the loss deductions available to
the investor-partners, real estate partnerships are documented to char-
acterize as much as possible of the cash paid to promoters as guaran-
teed payments deductible by the partnership. Less attractive options
include having the promoters receive compensation in ways not deduct-
ible by the partnership, such as by sale of an asset to the partnership
at a profit,9 ' and by giving them a more substantial share of the net
cash flow or proceeds of refinancing or sale.92
At first glance, the intensified use of the guaranteed payment pro-
vision may not seem particularly offensive. Because the cost of the
deduction by the partnership is that -the promoter must report the guar-
anteed payment as ordinary income, the situation could initially be
viewed as an inoffensive trade-off with little loss to the Treasury. The
problem is that numerous real estate promoters with substantial
amounts of extra tax losses for which they have no need, seek out "in-
vestors" in desperate need of tax shelter. In short, the guaranteed pay-
90. § 707(c).
91. Assuming the requisite holding period and that the promoter is not a "dealer,"
he would realize long-term capital gain on the transaction if the sales price bears a rea-
sonable relationship to the actual value of the asset transferred. The partnership, on
the other hand, would not be able to deduct immediately the payment to the promoter,
but would have to depreciate or amortize it. If, on the other hand, the purchase price
were so inflated that it reflected in part the value of the syndicator's services to the part-
nership, a portion of the ostensible gain on the sale would be taxed to the syndicator
as disguised compensation. Ben-Horin, Real Estate Syndications, Limited Partnerships,
U. So. CAL. 1972 TAX INST. 71, 83.
92. If the promoter were to accept an interest in the partnership rather than imme-
diate cash payments, his objectives might be to ultimately realize capital gain on the dis-
position of the partnership properties, and to defer recognition of ordinary income until
actual distribution of the profits. Ben-Horin, supra note 91, at 83:
Timing can be of critical importance in this context. Under one technique, the
syndicator will acquire his partnership interest for a nominal consideration, re-
flecting the then nominal capitalization of the partnership, prior to the transfer of
the investment property to the syndicate. Investor participation, at a price substan-
tially higher than that paid by the syndicator, takes place in conjunction with the
subsequent acquisition of the property. The resulting instant appreciation of the
syndicator's retained partnership interest has been held free from tax, although the
issue presented is surely not free from doubt.
Another problem with receiving a partnership interest for services is the decision
in Sol Diamond, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974), in which
it was held that the taxpayer's receipt of a profits interest for past services constituted
ordinary income to him when it was acquired. Before Sol Diamond, it generally had
been believed that "a profits interest received in exchange for services, whether past or
future, was not intended to be a taxable event under the regulations." Cowan, Receipt
of an Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case,
27 TAX L. REV. 161, 181 (1972). Practitioners are hoping that Diamond is limited to
receipts of interests for services performed in the past and are documenting transfers of
interest in terms of continuing obligations, such as for supervision.
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ment provision enables investors to assign their income to promoters
who have surplus losses.
There are several forms of purported guaranteed payments. One
basic approach is to compute the amount of cash the promoter would ex-
pect to receive, and characterize payments to the promoter in that
amount as compensation for services rather than as a distributive share
of net cash flow. 93 These payments are variously described as fees for
brokerage services, sales efforts, or management and supervision. An-
other approach is to have the promoters make interest-bearing loans to
the partnership, rather than contributions to partnership capital. In this
way, the partnership will claim deductions for the "interest" payments
to the promoter, who may make only a nominal payment designated a
contribution to capital.
One objection to many purported guaranteed payments is that
they represent disbursements that should be capitalized rather than im-
mediately deducted. No authority exists for the surprisingly prevalent
practice of deducting guaranteed payments to a partner that would clear-
ly have to be capitalized if made to a nonpartner.94 Except for carrying
charges, (certain taxes, interest, etc.), and ground rent, expenses in-
curred during construction by the single purpose partnership normally
should be capitalized. For example, a payment to a partner for super-
vising the construction of an apartment building is a capital expenditure
and should not be claimed as a current deduction by the partnership. 95
Some guaranteed payments claimed "for the use of capital" rep-
resent attempts to characterize payments to the promoter as deductible
interest payments rather than distributive shares of partnership profits.
In addition to being subject to the objections discussed above, many
"loans" to partnerships that form the basis for claims of guaranteed
payments are clearly subject to attack as being equity rather than debt.
The doctrinal distinctions between debt and equity are extremely com-
93. The allocation of cash to the promoter partners as guaranteed payments often
has an additional purpose beyond that of generating deductions. Many partnerships use
separate allocations of net cash flow, proceeds of refinancing or sale, and taxable income
or loss. If the allocation of taxable income or loss is unrelated to the allocations of
the cash benefits of the enterprise, it may be regarded as a special allocation that is sub-
ject to the principal purpose limitation. Bringing the partnership's allocation of taxable
income or loss in line with its allocation of net cash flow makes the conclusion less
likely that the allocation of taxable income or loss is a special allocation with no sub-
stantial economic effect. Kaster, Real Estate Limited Partnerships Special Tax Alloca-
tions, N.Y.U. 31st INST. ON FED. TAX. 1799, 1810 (1973).
94. Some of the more sophisticated practitioners in the area have expressed amaze-
ment at the extent to which partnerships have gone in claiming guaranteed payment de-
ductions. See, e.g., Kaster, supra note 93, at 1811-12.
95. The American Bar Association has recently recommended that § 707(c)
be amended to make clear that it does not permit a current deduction for what would
otherwise be a capital expenditure. ABA COMM. ON PARTNERSHIPS, Report of the Com-
mittee on Partnerships, Tax Section Recommendation No. 1974-7, 27 TAX LAw. 839, 862
(1974).
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plicated and fall outside the scope of this article. Although debt-equity
doctrines have been developed primarily in the corporate context,
the Tax Court has stated emphatically that they apply to partnerships
as well.96 More recently, the Service has issued several pronounce-
ments concerning partnerships that distinguish debt from equity for
basis purposes. 9 The Service could certainly incorporate more of the
debt-equity doctrines from the corporate area into the partnership
area.
98
Finally, many purported guaranteed payments are made with re-
gard to income, thus falling outside the statutory definition of a guar-
anteed payment. Admittedly, the "without regard to income" test is
sometimes difficult to apply to real estate partnerships. The income
concept is readily applied to mercantile and service businesses in which
taxable income and cash profits generally approximate each other. In
real estate partnerships, however, cash flow and taxable income are
rarely the same. If the test is taxable income, it is inapplicable to part-
nerships in the construction phase and during the first few years of ac-
celerated depreciation.
If, however, "without regard to income" means "without regard
to the availability of surplus cash," the test has important application
to current practice. Many tax advisers now tell their clients that a pay-
ment can qualify for deduction as a guaranteed payment even if it is
conditioned on -the availability of net cash flow. A distinction should
be made between cumulative and noncumulative rights. If the right
to receive a payment continues as an obligation of the partnership if
no available cash flow is available to pay it, a guaranteed payment
deduction clearly is available. On the other hand, if the right to the
payment is noncumulative, guaranteed payment treatment is clearly in-
appropriate. A further distinction might -be made between a percent-
age of gross and a percentage of profits. Although -the practice of
claiming a partnership deduction for percentage-of-net-profit payments
is nowhere specifically prohibited, it apparently falls outside the pur-
pose of the provision.99
3. Standing Mortgages
The standing or term mortgage is also receiving increased atten-
tion as a result of the limitations on deductions for prepaid interest.
A standing mortgage is one -that involves no repayment of principal
96. Joseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.C. 90, 100-01 (1964).
97. Rev. Proc. 72-135, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 200; Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 CuM.
BULL. 394. See also Shop Talk, J. TAXATION 62, 64 (1974).
98. See § 385, which deals with corporations, for factors that could be applied to
partnerships.
99. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (1954); cf. 2 S. SURREY, supra note
50, at 122 (1973).
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until the end of the loan period. The principal amount due is said
to "stand" because only interest payments are made until payment of
the balance, the "balloon," ultimately becomes due. Standing mort-
gages are currently attractive to promoters anxious to increase interest
deductions and decrease nondeductible payments to retire principal. 100
The use of a standing mortgage was challenged in Manuel D.
Mayerson,'0' in which the taxpayer "purchased" an office building by
making a minimal downpayment and giving a nonrecourse "purchase
money" note that required annual interest payments of $18,000 but no
repayment of principal for 99 years. The note was in the face amount
of $322,500, but could be satisfied by payment of $275,000 within the
first year or $298,750 within the two succeeding years. The taxpayer
did not exercise either of these options but did "negotiate" a reduced
purchase price of $200,000 approximately 5 years after the signing of
the note. The Service treated the purported sale as a lease with an
option to purchase and disallowed the depreciation deductions claimed
by the taxpayer. The Tax Court allowed the deductions.
The court said that under Crane v. Commissioner,'01 the non-
recourse nature of the obligation would not prevent it from being in-
cluded in the taxpayer's depreciable basis in the building. Moreover,
a valid debt obligation could exist even though no principal was re-
quired to be repaid for 99 years, an unusually long term which was
never expected to run its course. In finding a valid debt obligation,
the court stressed that the parties had dealt at arms length and had
never intended anything other than an absolute sale. It said that non-
recourse standing purchase-money mortgages were not uncommon in
connection with the type of transaction under consideration-the sale
of an unprofitable office building for which conventional financing was
unavailable. 03
Mayerson involved not only a subsequent reduction in purchase
price but also a liberal interpretation of "genuine indebtedness" that
has been a great comfort to many real estate practitioners. Mayerson
does not, however, sanction some of the more recent attempts to use
standing mortgages to increase and accelerate deductions. At most,
Mayerson offers protection for standing mortgages used in arms-length
transactions when conventional financing is unavailable. Currently,
some developers to whom conventional financing is available are at-
100. Prior to the depression, standing mortgages were much more common than 'they
are today, and were used extensively to finance personal residences. After it became
tragically apparent that homeowners cannot pay off "balloons" in severe economic
downturns, standing mortgages virtually disappeared from residential home financing.
101. 47 T.C. 340 (1966).
102. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
103. In Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 59, the Service emphasized that the fair
market value of the property had not been put in issue in Mayerson and that it would
construe the decision narrowly.
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tempting to use long-term standing mortgages or a series of short-term
standing mortgages to increase interest deductions and decrease the
nondeductible expenditure for debt amortization. If the parties do
not intend that -the sale will ever be fully consummated, the position
asserted by the Service in Mayerson is appropriate: the transaction is
actually a lease with an option to purchase and the "interest" payments
are actually lease payments. Depreciation deductions should be un-
available but the "interest" payments would presumably be deductible
as rent. Any "downpayment" should be treated as a premium for a
favorable lease, which must be capitalized and amortized over the lease
term. 104 If, on the other hand, a consummated sale is intended and if
the parties agree at the outset that the payment of the stated principal
will ultimately be forgiven, the arrangement is actually a self-amortizing
loan that has been documented as a standing loan to qualify the total
debt service payments as deductible interest.' 0 5
Mayerson suggests an additional abuse of the standing mortgage to
increase early depreciation deductions. The court sustained depreciation
deductions claimed on the basis of the full face amount of the note,
even though the note contained substantial discounts for early payment
and even though subsequent negotiation had reduced the amount
necessary to retire the note by more than a third. The court held that
the note's fluctuating amount did not render the full face amount too
indefinite to be included in basis as an enforceable and binding per-
sonal obligation, and refused to limit retroactively the amount included
in basis to the amount eventually required to repay it. The subse-
quently negotiated purchase price, like the reduced prices specified in
the note for early payment, was treated as a bonus discount for early
payment. The court concluded that "the cost basis at the time of the
purchase should be the nondiscount price."'0 6
Can a buyer eager for early deductions agree with the seller to
sign a standing note at an inflated face amount, while providing in the
note a bonus discount for early repayment that is actually the agreed-
upon purchase price, and then claim that the full face amount of the
note is properly included in depreciable basis? Or can the face amount
of the note be inflated without any stated discount for early payment
but accompanied by an understanding that a reduced purchase price
will subsequently be negotiated? Mayerson suggests these techniques
but leaves uncertain the extent to which they can be employed success-
104. See Leonard Marcus, 30 T.C.M. 1263 (1971), in which the taxpayer was not
allowed to include in his depreciable basis in bowling alleys, nonrecourse obligations in
face amounts significantly in excess of the original offering prices of his vendors, that
had periods of repayment well in excess of the useful life of the properties purchased.
See generally M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263 (lst Cir. 1970);
and World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
105. Stated differently, the "interest" payments would be considered combined pay-
ments of principal and interest.
106. 47 T.C. at 354.
[Vol. 1974
YEAREND SALES OF LOSSES
fully. At ,the very least, the full face amount of the note should -not
be included in basis to the extent that the parties understood it was
inflated. 1'07
4. Wraparound Mortgages
The wraparound mortgage has also received a good deal of at-
tention recently as a device for increasing early interest deductions.' 08
A wraparound mortgage is a junior mortgage that includes in its face
amount the amount of senior financing encumbering the property
pledged as security.'09 Wraparounds are usually used when existing
financing either cannot be prepaid, can be prepaid only upon payment
of a substantial penalty, or carries an advantageous interest rate. 10
Typically, the borrower makes payments to the wraparound lender on
the basis of -the full face amount of the wraparound loan, and the wrap-
around lender services the senior debt out of these payments. The
lender, -therefore, can increase the return on the money it actually ad-
vances-the spread between the senior financing and the face amount
of the wraparound loan-by charging a higher rate of interest on the
full face amount than maintains on the senior financing, without as-
suming liability on the latter.I"
Consider how purchasers of encumbered property have used
wraparound mortgages to accelerate deductions. Ordinarily, a seller of
property initially requests the purchaser to take over existing financing
and to make an additional cash payment to purchase the equity. The
107. The court relied on Blackstone Theater Co., 12 T.C. 801 (1949), acquiesced
in, 1949-2 CuM. BULL. 1, for the proposition that the depreciation deductions claimed
by the taxpayer would not be retroactively reduced because the note obligation included
in depreciable basis was subsequently discharged for much less than its face amount.
The taxpayer in Blackstone had purchased a building in 1941 when it was subject to
$120,950 in tax liens. Between 1941 and 1945 it lacked the funds to satisfy those liens
but acquired additional backing late in 1945 and satisfied the liens at a foreclosure pro-
ceeding in 1946 for $50,220. The Service contended that its depreciation deductions for
years prior to 1946 should be recomputed, but the court held that these depreciation de-
ductions would not be "retroactively reduced." Blackstone, therefore, deals neither with
a pre-arranged reduction in the amount of an obligation, nor with a situation in which
the taxpayer continued to depreciate on the basis of the full amount of an obligation
that he had funds to satisfy at less than the stated amount.
108. Although wraparound mortgages have only very recently received any currency
in the United States, they have been extensively used in Canada for over 30 years, where
they are known as blanket mortgages. Gunning, The Wrap-Around Mortgage . . .
Friend or U.F.O.?, 2 REAL EST. REy. 35, 36 (1972). Wraparound mortgages have also
been referred to in this country as overlapping deeds of trust and all-inclusive loans.
109. For a good introduction to wraparound mortgages see 3 POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY ch. 37B (P. Rohan ed. 1973).
110. Hershman, Usury and "New Look" in Real Estate Financing, 4 REAL PROP.
PROBATE & TRuST J. 315, 323-24 (1969).
111. For examples indicating favorable yields that can be obtained by wraparound
lenders in refinancing and sale situations see Nad, Financing Techniques and Prob-
lems: Wrap-Around Mortgages, Unuseable Interest Deductions, and Interest Subsidy,
N.Y.U. 29Tm INST. ON FEn. TAX 1107, 1109-10 (1971).
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purchaser responds with an offer to give the seller a wraparound note
including both the face amount of existing financing and the cash bal-
ance, at a higher rate of interest than the existing financing. He will
attempt to persuade the seller to accept a lower total purchase price
by demonstrating the more attractive yield of -the wraparound. The
seller would report a smaller amount realized, taxable as long-term cap-
ital gain except to the extent of recapture, but would have to report the
additional interest at ordinary income rates.112  If the seller agrees
to the reduced price, the purchaser will be giving up a higher basis
in the property, part of which, presumably, would have been
attributable to nondepreciable land. He will, however, have struc-
tured a transaction that provides the basis for a claim to greater interest
deductions. To put icing on the cake, the purchaser probably will pre-
pay a year's interest on the wraparound obligation. 113
James A. Collins"' is the leading case on the deductibility of in-
terest payments under a wraparound mortgage. In 1962, the taxpayers,
husband and wife, won $140,000 in the Irish Sweepstakes. They
were approached by a real estate company that read of their winnings.
On November 12, 1962, they signed a "Deposit Receipt and Purchase
Contract," offering to purchase an apartment building listed with the
company at a total price of $168,000, of which $63,000 was to be paid
in cash and placed in escrow. The taxpayers were "to purchase prop-
erty on contract subject to existing loan of $105,000," which bore inter-
est at the rate of 7.2 percent. The final provision was that "purchase
must be completed prior to Dec. 31, 1962 and escrow closed."
In the first week of December, the parties signed a second pur-
chase contract that contained somewhat different financing terms. It
specified a lower total purchase price but provided for a wraparound
note to the purchasers at a higher rate of interest than the existing fi-
nancing. The total price was stated to be $158,000, $19,315 of which
was to be paid in cash as a downpayment. The balance due was stated
to be $139,485, payable in installments of $830 per month, with in-
terest at the rate of 8.4 percent.
The transaction as finally consummated gave the sellers the same
amount of cash at the closing as the initial proposal. The payments
on the wraparound note were equal to the debt service on the senior
financing. The final contract, which was recorded on December 12,
reflected an outstanding loan of $104,204.86, with interest at the rate
of 7.2 percent per annum, payable in monthly installments of $827.
112. For a discussion of the tax problems confronting a seller who becomes a wrap-
around mortgagee see Barnett, Use of the Wrap-Around Mortgage in Realty Sales: The
Tax Advantages and Problems, 40 J. TAxATIoN 274, 275-76 (1974).
113. See McGuire, Limited Partnerships: Steps that Can Be Taken To Overcome
Problems in the Area, 34 J. TAXATION 235, 236 (1971).
114. 54 T.C. 1656 (1970).
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The sellers were to make these payments when due. The taxpayers
were to receive a deed to the property only when they had paid the
entire amount due under the final contract, or by assuming the senior
financing at any point after the balance due under the wraparound note
was equal to the balance on the existing financing. The cash down-
payment of $19,315 was to be placed in escrow. Finally, and most
importantly, the taxpayers were also to place a prepayment of interest
in escrow:
IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE DOWN PAYMENT AND
CHARGES IN THIS ESCROW, the buyer herein is to deposit into
escrow the interest on within mentioned contract for first 5 years,
which is $48,299.70, but in consideration of such prepayment of
interest, sellers herein are allowing a discount of $4,000.00 to said
buyers and buyers are to place the sum of $44,299.70 into escrow,
prior to close thereof."'
The sellers of the property, also husband and wife, reported this sum
of $44,299.70 as prepaid interest"' on their 1962 tax return. Because
of a large rental loss they claimed the same year, the sellers had no
tax liability in 1962.
The Service argued that the December 12 contract was a sham
and ,lacked economic substance, -and that "no true indebtedness was
created and -there was no bona fide interest paid, and what was called
payment of interest was merely part of the downpayment." Taxpayers
had been represented by a certified public accountant "who had repre-
sented other sweepstakes winners in their tax matters." Prior to the
signing of the November 12 contract, the accountant had made clear
that
• ..a subsequent contract would be worked out which would give
sellers the same cash payment of at least $63,000 but the contract
would call for a lower purchase price, lower downpayment, and
installment payments with interest over a 5-year period and the
prepayment of this interest. It was the C.P.A.'s task to work up
the figures to be contained in the contract which would provide
for the payment to sellers of at least $63,000 but the contract
would recite that part of this amount would be downpayment on
the purchase price and part prepayment of interest."17
The Tax Court accepted the Service's argument and disallowed the de-
duction for prepaid interest."18 The court said that the fact that the
115. Id. at 1660.
116. At the time, it was common practice to deduct up to 5 years of prepaid interest,
under authority of I.T. 3740, 1945 CuM. BULL. 109. When I.T. 3740 was revoked by
Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76, the latter stated that "this Revenue Ruling
will be applied without retroactive effect to interest prepayments for periods not in ex-
cess of five years made prior to November 26, 1968." id. at 77-78.
117. 54 T.C. at 1662.
118. The transaction we find to be a sham is not the acquisition of the apartment
house but the prepayment of interest and the loan agreement. We accept the con-
tention that the motivating factor in the purchase of the apartment house was eco-
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seller reported the amount labeled interest as interest income "is not
significant-especially since he had a large loss that year."
The Collins court could easily find that no genuine indebtedness ex-
isted because the seller testified that he did not understand the taxpayers
to have been indebted to him. Even without such direct testimony,
use of a wraparound loan can suggest an absence of genuine indebted-
ness. For example, suppose the seller continues to retire the senior
indebtedness, and the purchaser pays interest only on a 60-year non-
recourse note in connection with property having a useful life of less
-than 60 years. The likelihood that the principal will never be paid
indicates a lack of genuine indebtedness, although some interpretations
of Mayerson could preclude such a finding. Even if the indebtedness
is valid under Mayerson, the payments could be found to be something
other than interest. In Collins, the court could have said that the "inter-
est" payment was, in reality, a part of the downpayment. The Service
could argue that the increased yield attributable to the difference in in-
terest rates between the underlying obligation and the wraparound note
is a payment of principal to the seller." 9
5. Three-Way Allocation Systems
After the maximum amount of deductions has been generated,
partnership promoters frequently employ an allocation system that is
designed to give yearend admittees a greater proportionate share of the
losses than they have of cash benefits. As indicated above, the basic ap-
proach is to employ three primary allocations: one for net cash flow, one
for proceeds in the event of refinancing or sale; and one for taxable in-
come or loss. By using different allocation ratios, the three are distributed
differently. Often, all the cash benefits of the enterprise are distrib-
uted under the first two allocations, and the taxable income or loss al-
location controls only the allocation of tax losses. Thus, the yearend
admittee can be allocated a greater percentage of tax losses than of
cash benefits. The result is often that the yearend admittee is al-
nomic gain. It is the terms used to support the deduction of prepaid interest...
which we consider to be a sham.
Id.
119. Finally, the court could have said that the deduction for prepaid interest would
be disallowed because the prepayment of interest did not represent "purposive economic
activity." As set out more fully below, such a statement is analytically distinct from
a "sham" analysis, though the court's opinion did not adequately distinguish the two.
The Collins court said that the situation before it was indistinguishable in principle
from that in the Goldstein case, to be discussed below, and cited the Tax Court's opin-
ion in that case, which disallowed an interest deduction on the ground that there was
a "sham," or nongenuine indebtedness. The problem is that, on appeal, the Second
Circuit said that a "sham" analysis was improper in Goldstein, but that interest deduc-
tions should, nevertheless, be disallowed because they did not support "purposive eco-
nomic activity."
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located all the tax losses for the entire year, but 'little of the cash bene-
fit. 120
These allocation systems are difficult to attack under the principal
purpose limitation of section 704(b)(2). First, care is usually taken
to relate the allocation of taxable income or loss -to some economic as-
pect of the partnership, such as initial contribution to capital. Second,
it is difficult -to determine how an allocation of taxable income or loss
in a partnership agreement should be reallocated in the event it is dis-
regarded. The Code provides that if an allocation does not pass muster
under the principal purpose limitation, it will be disregarded and real-
located according to the partners' ratio for sharing "taxable income or
loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)(9)."''l Con-
sider the dilemma presented the eager tax collector who would like
to disregard the allocation of taxable income or -loss, but is faced with
the rule that disregarded allocations are to be reallocated in accordance
with taxable income or loss. The escape from this dilemma lies in the
fact that "taxable income or loss, as described in section 702(a) (9)"
was intended to be the partners' ratio for sharing the overall profits and
losses of the enterprise. 2 ' Therefore, if the partners' allocation of tax-
able income or loss is disregarded because it controls only tax losses and
is for the principal purpose of tax avoidance, the losses should be re-
allocated according to the partners' shares in the economic consequences
of the enterprise. 123
B. Other Arguments Against the Yearend Admittee
1. Tax Avoidance Motive in General
Gregory v. Helvering'14 is generally considered the classic Su-
120. For a detailed hypothetical fully explaining this result see Weidner, Passing
Depreciation to Investor-Partners, 25 S.C.L. REV. 215, 227-29 (1973). A partial re-
sponse to such allocation systems is contained in Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 22, at 17, in which the Service stated that it will not issue advance rulings or de-
termination letters unless the following conditions are satisfied:
.01 The interests of all of the general partners, taken together, in each ma-
terial item of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction or credit is equal to at least
one percent of each such item at all times during the existence of the partnership.
In determining the general partners' interest in such items, limited partnership in-
terests owned by the general partners shall not be taken into account.
.02 The aggregate deductions to be claimed by the partners as their distribu-
tive shares of partnership losses for the first two years of operation of the limited
partnership will not exceed the amount of equity capital invested in the limited
partnership.
121. § 704.
122. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(1), (2) (1956). The Committee on Partnerships
of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association has recently recommended
that the Code be amended "to provide specifically that the tax avoidance limitation of
section 704(b)(2) is to apply not only to the allocation of items described in section
702(a) (1) through (8), but also to the allocation of taxable income or loss, as described
in section 702(a)(9)." Committee on Partnerships, supra note 95, at 847.
123. For further discussion of the problems concerning three-way allocation systems
see Weidner, supra note 120.
.124. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The taxpayer in Gregory wanted stock held by her
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preme Court statement that tax benefits will not be denied simply be-
cause they motivated a transaction. Nevertheless, the Court held that
the absence of a business purpose will result in denial of the tax bene-
fits of Code provisions premised on commercial transactions. 12 5  Be-
yond the business purpose cases is a further line of cases disallowing
interest deductions in a variety of tax avoidance schemes. These cases
can be viewed as an even stronger basis for a general theory of tax
avoidance because the interest deduction is not premised on a business
or commercial -transaction.126  A deduction is available, for example,
for interest on money borrowed for purely personal purposes.
Knetsch v. United States 27 is the leading Supreme Court decision
on the interest deduction. It concerned an arrangement in which the
taxpayer borrowed from an annuity company at 3.5 interest to purchase
annuity contracts that yielded 2.5 interest. 28  The Court said that
under Gregory it was irrelevant that the taxpayer entered -the trans-
actions only to secure interest deductions. 2 9 Nevertheless, it held that
corporation transferred to her without having the distribution taxed as a dividend. In
an attempt to avail herself of the nonrecognition of gain provisions applicable to a
corporate reorganization, she created a third corporation, transferred the shares to it,
and immediately caused it to be dissolved and to distribute the shares to her. The
Court said the transaction would not be disregarded simply because its ulterior purpose
was to escape payment of a tax. The transaction was taxed as a dividend because
the corporation created and immediately dissolved had "no business or corporate pur-
pose" but was a "contrivance" set up "not to reorganize a business or any part of a
business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner." Id. at 469.
125. For a collection and discussion of the cases see Young, The Role of Motive
in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 TAx LAw. 275 (1969). In Commissioner
v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949), Judge
Learned Hand stressed that the doctrine of Gregory is not limited to corporate reorgani-
zation cases:
It has a much wider scope; it means that in construing words of a tax statute which
describe commercial or industrial transactions we are to understand them to refer to
transactions entered upon for commercial and industrial purposes and not to include
transactions entered upon for no other motive but to escape taxation.
126. Some Code provisions deny tax advantages to arrangements undertaken for par-
ticular motives or purposes. For example, an allocation in a partnership agreement
will be disregarded if its principal purpose is the avoidance or evasion of tax. Other
provisions, although not explicitly referring to motive or purpose, premise the availabil-
ity of a tax advantage on activity of a particular type. Depreciation deductions, for
example, are available only with respect to property used in a trade or business or
held for the production of income. Finally, there are provisions that on their face
allow tax advantage independent of motive or purpose. The deduction for interest paid
on indebtedness is, of course, a prime example.
127. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
128. The transaction was actually far more complicated but is noted here because
there was no possibility of economic gain aside from the tax consequence.
129. A variant on the scheme used in Knetsch was to bring in a third party lender,.
usually a bank. In Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 908 (1960), the taxpayer purchased an annual premium annuity policy and
paid the first premium. Thereafter, he borrowed to increase the policy's cash or loan
value, then borrowed the increase in value to pay off the loan undertaken to create
that value, and claimed interest deductions for payments made on the loans on the
policy. Stated differently, he borrowed at 4% to obtain a discount of less than 3%
for prepayment. Stated one last way, he immediately recouped most of the alleged
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no indebtedness had been created for tax purposes because the trans-
action was a sham that offered the -taxpayer "nothing of substance"
beyond an interest deduction. Knetsch left unclear whether the reason
the interest deductions were disallowed was that no genuine indebted-
ness had been created under local law, or whether the reason was that
a genuine indebtedness had been created -that served no function other
than to generate interest deductions. 130 Stated differently, the Court
left unclear whether the transaction was a sham because the legal rela-
tionships purportedly created were found not -to exist, or because those
relationships existed but served no economic function other than tax
avoidance.
In Goldstein v. Commissioner,'' the Second Circuit stated un-
equivocally that interest on an indebtedness enforceable under local
law is not deductible if it does not involve "purposive economic ac-
tivity." In 1958, Tillie Goldstein won $140,218 in the Irish Sweep-
stakes. Her son Bernard, a certified public accountant, arranged two
similar -transactions with the aid of an attorney to invest her winnings
and minimize the tax consequences of -the sudden increase in income.
First, with the assistance of a brokerage house, Mrs. Goldstein bor-
rowed $465,000 from the First National Bank of Jersey City to pur-
chase 1 / percent Treasury notes in the face amount of $500,000.
These notes were promptly pledged as collateral to secure -the loan.
At the same time, again with Bernard's help, Mrs. Goldstein obtained
a $480,000 loan from the Royal State Bank of New York to purchase
a second block of Treasury notes, at 1 /2 percent in the face amount
of $500,000, which she pledged as security for the Royal State loan.
Late in December 1958, Mrs. Goldstein prepaid $81,396.61, the inter-
est that would ,be due on the loans if -they were to remain outstanding
until maturity.
The Second Circuit rejected the Tax Court's conclusion that both
,transactions were shams that created no genuine indebtedness.'1 2  It
prepayments of interest by borrowing on the increase in cash surrender value the pay-
ments caused. The circuit court found the Tax Court's conclusion that the only pur-
pose of the transactions was the creation of a tax deduction correct, and emphasized
the mere fact that "there may be an obligation which is valid under local law is not
determinative of whether there is a true indebtedness within the meaning of Section
163." 270 F.2d at 298.
130. The latter seems to be the correct interpretation. See Blum, Knetsch v. United
States: A Pronouncement on Tax Avoidance, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 135, 149. The incor-
poration of this vague standard into the interest deduction was resisted by the three
dissenting Justices who protested that the majority had disallowed Knetsch's deduction
"because the annuity device was devoid of commercial substance." 364 U.S. at 371
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
131. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
132. The Second Circuit stated four basic factors supporting its conclusion that a
genuine indebtedness had been created. (1) Mrs. Goldstein was personally liable on
the notes she gave each bank. (2) Both banks "were independent financial institutions;
it cannot be said that their sole fuinction was to finance transactions such as those
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agreed with the dissent in the Tax Court that "these loan arrangements
were . . . regular and, moreover, indistinguishable from any other
legitimate loan transaction contracted for the purchase of Government
securities.' 1 33  Nevertheless, it disallowed -the interest deductions. It
based its decision on the finding ,that the transactions had been entered
into "without any realistic expectation of economic profit and solely in
order to secure a large interest deduction,"'1 and said that tax con-
sequences alone were insufficient to sustain an interest deduction. The
court based its holding on the underlying purpose of the interest deduc-
tion-the "Congressional policy of encouraging purposive activity to be
financed through borrowing." This policy would be frustrated if de-
ductions were allowed "for interest paid on funds borrowed for no pur-
posive reason, other than the securing of a deduction," and transactions
would be encouraged "that have no economic utility and that would
not be engaged in but for the system of taxes imposed by Congress."""'
Because the court found "no prospect" of economic profit, the case
did not specify the probability of eventual profit necessary to prevent
a finding of nonpurposive activity. Cases since Goldstein have indi-
cated that the purposive-activity requirement is not satisfied by a profit
that could not have been reasonably anticipated at the inception of the
transaction.'3 6  None, however, has retreated from the basic position
that the motive of a particular taxpayer in entering a -transaction is not
sufficient reason for disallowing tax benefits.'
37
2. The Yearend Admittee
Suppose Mrs. Goldstein had decided to become a yearend admit-
tee to a real estate partnership and that her accountant approached a
before us." 364 F.2d at 737. (3) The loan transactions did not return the parties
to their original positions for over a year. (4) Both banks possessed substantial con-
trol over the future of their respective loan arrangements.
133. 364 F.2d at 737.
134. 364 F.2d at 740. The Second Circuit said that the Tax Court had properly
rejected the contention that Mrs. Goldstein "intended a sophisticated, speculative, sortie
into the market for government securities." Id. at 739. The most damaging evidence
introduced was a set of computations that had been made by Bernard contemporaneously
with the commencement of the transactions that "almost conclusively" established that
an "economic loss" had been anticipated from the outset. Id.
135. Id. at 741, 742. The court admitted that the underlying purpose of the inter-
est deduction "is difficult to articulate because this provision is extremely broad: there
is no requirement that deductible interest serve a business purpose, that it be ordinary
and necessary, or even that it be reasonable." Id. at 741.
136. In Estate of Frank Cohen, 29 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 1221 (1970), the "reason-
able expectation of economic profit" requirement was applied to disallow interest deduc-
tions stemming from a transaction that actually produced a profit potential. The court
said that "the transaction per se was of sufficient substance to avert a finding of sham,"
id. at 1227, but disallowed the deduction on the ground that the taxpayer "could not
• * * reasonably expect the transaction to have an appreciable effect on his beneficial
interest." Id. at 1228 (emphasis in original).
137. See also Gabinet, supra note 85, at 470 n.18; Herbert Enoch, 57 T.C. 781,
796 (1972).
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promoter of real estate partnerships that specialize in maximum ac-
celerated loss deductions. Suppose further that the accountant se-
lected a partnership for her on the basis of a computer print-out that
offered a substantial retroactive allocation of pre-admission losseS
138
and a schedule of future losses. Because retroactive loss allocation
would serve the same function as prepayment of interest, and because
the Service has recently expressed concern over uneconomic tax shelter
arrangements, 3 9 this alternative investment by Mrs. Goldstein may be
subject to a similar attack.
Although Goldstein dealt with the interest deduction, it can be
read as authority for the larger principle that taxpayers will not be per-
mitted to purchase tax losses without also acquiring a reasonable pos-
sibility of economic profit. The question then becomes whether the
yearend acquisition of a real estate partnership interest differs signifi-
cantly from the alleged attempts of sweepstakes winners 'to speculate
in the short-term paper markets. One major difference is that profit
potential cannot easily be disproved in the acquisition of real estate
partnership interests. Limited partners may be entitled to share in all
the cash flow that is generated over an unlimited period of time and
in the appreciation in value of the partnership assets. The variables
affecting profit potential are much greater and can operate over a
longer period of time in limited partnership cases than in Treasury bill
cases.
Nevertheless, many real estate partnerships offer the limited part-
ners no possibility of appreciation in value of an underlying asset nor
any possibility of an increase in cash return. The possibility of profit
from residual value may be effectively eliminated when the partnership
asset is a building constructed on leased land. Similarly, many real estate
partnerships enter management agreements or leases that assign any
increase in cash flow to a management company, frequently an affiliate
of the promoter general partner. Consider the following arrangement
which has been frequently used in real estate syndications. 140 The asset
138. Some attorneys concerned over the validity of retroactive loss allocations are
advising their clients to refrain from documenting their predictions of preadmission
losses to prospective investor-partners.
139. In Rev. Proc. 72-9, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 718, 720, the Service indicated it will
not issue advance rulings or determination letters on the "results of transactions which
lack bona fide business purpose or have as their principal purpose the reduction of
Federal taxes." More recently, Commissioner Alexander has specifically indicated that
limited partnerships with little or no expectation of economic profit will come under
attack. See "Uneconomic" Tax Shelter Arrangements Hit by Commissioner Alexander,
40 J. TAXATION 37 (1974). Most recently, the Service has refused to issue advance
rulings or determination letters with respect to "[w]hether the principal purpose of any
provision in the partnership agreement, with respect to a partner's distributive share
of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit, is the avoidance or evasion
of Federal Income Tax." Rev. Proc. 74-22, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 35, at 16. See
also Rev. Proc. 74-17, supra note 120.
140. See, e.g., Graybar Building Associates, Prospectus, March 10, 1958, reprinted
in part in P. DAvID, URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT 44-60 (1970).
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the partnership acquires is the lease of an office building. The partnership
pays a substantial premium for the acquisition of the leasehold interest
and amortizes the amount over the lease term. It subleases to a
management company which pays a fixed rent to the partnership and
is therefore entitled to retain any increase in cash flow resulting from
increased profitability of the building. When the partnership is so
structured, the purpose of economic profit can more easily be eliminated
because the limited partners are purchasing nothing more than a sched-
ule of losses and a modest cash return. Thus the investment in Treasury
bills is more closely approximated.
One problem in applying the purposive-activity requirement to the
yearend admittee is that section 702(b) uses an entity rather than an
aggregate theory of partnerships to determine the character of items
of income and loss reported by the individual partners: "The character
of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit included in a
partner's distributive share . . . shall be determined as if such items
were realized directly from the source from which realized by the part-
nership, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by the partner-
ship." The yearend admittee may argue with some validity that this
provision precludes the imposition of the purposive economic activity
test on the individual partner if the test is satisfied by the partner-
ship. 141
One argument that could be made in response is that the yearend
admittee is not a member of the partnership for tax purposes. A col-
lection of individuals who clearly constitute a partnership for purposes
of state law may fail to qualify as a partnership for tax purposes. 4 '
For example, if a dummy corporation with insubstantial assets is the
sole general partner in what is clearly a valid limited partnership under
state law, the organization may be taxed as an association. 43  The
argument can be made that the yearend admittee is not a partner for
tax purposes because he does not have "an objective to carry on busi-
ness and divide the gains therefrom."' 44  Again, this argument can be
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (1956) provides, in part, as follows: "[A] partner's
distributive share of gain from the sale of depreciable property used in the trade or
business of the partnership shall be considered as gain from the sale of such deprecia-
ble property in the hands of the partner."
142. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(b), (c) (1965).
143. See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1965); Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-
1 CuM. BULL. 735.
144. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(1), (2) (1965).
The SEC's proposed guide for the preparation of registration statements relating to
interests in real estate limited partnerships states:
G. Section 183. The possible impact of this Code section on investors lacking a
profit objective in investing in any tax shelter program which is expected to generate
annual tax losses for tax purposes for a period of years should be discussed. The
discussion should note that the section may apply to the partners of a partnership
not withstanding any profit objective the partnership itself may be deemed to have.
Securities Act Release N~s. 5465 and 10663 (March 1, 1974). This statement was a
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made more persuasively in the con-text of partnerships using leasing or
other arrangements that tend to deprive limited partners of potential
profit.
The argument that some -limited partners -are not partners for tax
purposes can be restated in terms of debt-equity principles, which are
applicable to partnerships as well as to corporations. If the yearend
admittee risks his capital and shares in whatever net cash flow 'and asset
appreciation is generated, arguing that he is not a partner for tax pur-
poses is difficult. If, on the other hand, the limited partner receives
only a maximum schedule of cash flow payments, a strong argument
can be made that for tax purposes he is a lender charging contingent
interest, not a partner. This argument is strongest when the limited
partner receives a guaranteed return, whether the guarantee takes the
form of a promise of the promoter-partner or of a net lease from the
promoter's management company.
The strongest challenge to the yearend admittee, however, focuses
more narrowly on the retroactive loss allocation and stresses that pro-
moters are using such allocations to "traffic" in tax losses. An argu-
ment can be made that, in economic reality, two separate -things have
been purchased: first, a tax loss in the amount of the retroactive 'alloca-
tion; second, a prospective interest in a real estate partnership, the pur-
chase of which was a condition to 'the purchase of 'the losses. Judicial
recognition of this reality could be used in one of two ways: first, to
directly disregard the loss allocation because it violates fundamental
principles against trafficking in losses; or second, to consider the policy
against trafficking sufficient reason 'to resolve any ambiguity in 'the
Code and Regulations against the yearend admittee. In other words,
economic reality can be used to bolster the arguments made in this
article that the admission of yearend admittees is covered by existing
proration requirements, and that those requirements are not overriden
by the general flexibility given partners under sections 761 and 704.1'5
IV. CONCLUSION
Two existing proration requirements can be applied to deprive the
yearend admit-tee to a real estate partnership of the benefit of a retro-
surprise because the Service had never announced that it would apply § 183 to real estate
tax shelters. See generally Lee, A Blend of Old Wine in a New Wineskin" Section 183
and Beyond, 29 TAx L. REv. 347 (1974).
145. Before specific legislation dealing with the problem was passed, corporations
with income to offset often sought out and acquired other corporations that had accumu-
lated substantial net operating losses carryovers and claimed these losses against their
own income on a post-affiliation consolidated return. The Supreme Court disallowed
such a deduction from a transaction antedating legislative resolution of the problem.
Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1932). For a discussion of traf-
ficking in corporate losses see B. BrrrKEx & J. EuSTACE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AN SHAREHOLDERS 15.24, 16.02 (1971).
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active loss allocation. The first is the rule that a partnership is termi-
nated for tax purposes if a 50-percent or greater interest in both capital
and profits is sold or exchanged within a 12-month period. The con-
structive turnabout distribution that takes place when new limited part-
ners are admitted is sufficient to render this admission an "exchange"
within the meaning of this rule. An even stronger argument can be
made under the second rule, which requires proration whenever a part-
ner's interest is reduced. In the type of transaction under considera-
tion, the interest of the general partner is reduced at yearend as shares
in profits, capital, and tax losses are shifted to the newly admitted part-
ners.
Because the arguments on the basis of -these two proration rules
are so strong, the advocates of retroactive loss allocations have not cast
their arguments in terms of the history or interpretation of those rules.
Rather, they vaguely assert that the proration rules are somehow over-
ridden by a general authorization of retroactive amendments to a part-
nership agreement and by the general discretion of partners over al-
location. Such override is unsupported by any clear authority. More-
over, the general policy against trafficking in tax losses should be
enough to resolve whatever ambiguity exists in favor of a determination
against override.
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